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Abstract: This article analyzes the nature of ethnic Germans’ identities and 
nationalisms in what is now modern Slovenia from the beginning of the 
Third Reich in 1933 to the Nazi invasion of Yugoslavia in 1941. The reactions 
of these Germans to world and local events are examined through the prism 
of local German-language media and archival sources, which show that eth-
nic Germans at this time were conflicted by multiple identities and national-
isms: one that most strongly aligned with the German nationalism of Nation-
al Socialist ideology, and one that was marked by a robust Austro-Catholic 
regional identity aligned with conservative Christian Austrians in neighbor-
ing Austria. This article therefore adds to an understanding of the appeal of 
National Socialism for and types of nationalism of ethnic Germans outside of 
the Third Reich, as well as the role of religion in Austrian identity formation 
in the early twentieth century.
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In the period immediately following the end of the First World War, almost one-
quarter of the tens of millions German-speakers in Europe lived outside the bor-
ders of the German Reich.1 After the end of the Great War, a small portion of these 
so-called Volksdeutsche, or ethnic Germans located outside of the Reich, lived in the 
former Habsburg crownlands of Carinthia, Carniola, and the southern portion of 
Styria.2 These regions became part of the new Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slo-
venes (later, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia), bordering the new Republic of Austria 
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and housing an ethnic Slovene majority accompanied by a not inconsiderable num-
ber of formerly Austrian German-speakers. The ethnic German minority in Slove-
nia was, unlike the Germans of Poland or Hungary, a largely urban, wealthy, edu-
cated, social elite who were highly cognizant of their former position as the domi-
nant ethnic group in Habsburg Austria, and paid attention to political events hap-
pening throughout the interwar period in both Germany and Austria.3 
Though relatively small in number, the history of this German minority in inter-
war Slovenia can tell us much about German nationalism, the appeal of National 
Socialism, and the power of religion in the molding of a distinct Austro-Catho-
lic German identity. In this article, I will examine the ways in which the German-
speaking minority of Slovenia reacted to and were shaped by events in Germany 
after the National Socialist seizure of power in 1933, as well as political events in 
Austria through the 1938 Anschluss, up through the Third Reich’s 1941 invasion of 
Yugoslavia.4 I analyze the dynamics of ethnic Germans’ nationalism and identity in 
Slovenia, as a minority group in a Slavic country that bordered on a large German-
speaking country. This analysis is based primarily upon German-language newspa-
pers in the context of their editorial stance and readership, whose articles are under-
stood to be at times expressing widely-held opinions as well as urging or imploring 
a certain viewpoint upon portions of its readership who feel different about a topic.5 
As will be shown, the German press in Slovenia at this time had strong pro-
Nazi sentiments, which was partly shared and partly opposed by their readership. 
Through the prism of the pro-Nazi editorial stances of the German press, I argue 
that Germans in Slovenia had multiple types of nationalisms: one, strongly in line 
with the German nationalism of National Socialism, and another type of national-
ism that I call ‘Austro-Catholicism’, an ethno-religious identity, which was resistant 
to the allure of Nazi ideology and lay rooted in the concept of a German and Catho-
lic Austrian cultural identity. These complex identities and nationalisms among the 
Germans of Slovenia were at times in conflict with each other and were shaped by 
ongoing political events in interwar Europe. 
The core insights of this article are: that there were different types of German 
nationalisms in interwar Slovenia and these were shaped by the political events 
of the time; that, though many Germans in Slovenia were supportive of National 
Socialism, a significant minority were more resistant; and that, based upon the pro-
Nazi slant among the German press at the time, the nature of these conflicting iden-
tities and the influence of both National Socialism and a distinctive Austrian Catho-
lic culture upon the German minority in Slovenia can be distinguished.6
German-speakers within the borders of what is now modern-day Slovenia, 
who were separated almost overnight from the German-majority countries of Ger-
many and Austria after 1918, reacted negatively to their newfound status as an eth-
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nic minority in the immediate aftermath of the Great War. They did this in part as 
a response to the reversed power relations in the region, as the new Slovene-major-
ity authorities consistently pushed to reduce the public presence of the German lan-
guage and culture.7 One subtle response that was taken can be seen in a report by 
John Dyneley Prince, the U.S. Ambassador to the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slo-
venes, who wrote that, in Slovenia, “the Austrians counted 100,000 Germans, but 
the Yugoslavs reckon only 40,000 of these people.” He explained this “great discrep-
ancy” as due to “the fact that many real Germans of this territory, who for commer-
cial reasons are bilingual, now prefer, for obvious political causes, to count themselves 
as Slavs under the present regime, although they still continue to use the German 
language among themselves.”8 Thus, in the immediate post-war period and through 
much of the following interwar period, many Germans in Slovenia emphasized cul-
tural and social ties to neighboring Austria and the Weimar Republic, the largest Ger-
man-majority states in Europe, as a way of pushing back against what they viewed as 
oppressive “slovenization” measures to take away their German identity. 
German identity in Slovenia in the first years of the interwar period was defined 
by a shared Germanic culture, language, and history. Religion as well was an impor-
tant cultural issue for some of Yugoslavia’s more than 500,000 ethnic Germans.9 For 
example, many Germans in Slovenia, who were overwhelmingly Catholic, viewed 
the leadership of the largest German cultural association in the kingdom with sus-
picion, as they were perceived to be overly Protestant.10 Such religious and cul-
tural divisions among Yugoslavia’s diverse ethnic German population made it diffi-
cult ever to present a united political front for representing German interests in the 
country.11
Despite certain religious differences between Slovenia’s Catholic German popula-
tion and Protestant Germans in the rest of Yugoslavia, religious identity remained in 
the background throughout the 1920s, as the secular aspects of German culture and 
education were perceived to be more strongly under attack. Through cultural and 
political organizations, Germans in Slovenia attempted to maintain and strengthen 
their unique German cultural identity, as well as to reverse the closings of German-
language schools. These attempts largely failed, however, and with the onset of the 
Great Depression in the early 1930s, the prevailing mood among many Germans in 
Slovenia was exploited by the National Socialist German Workers’ Party.12
The rise to power of the Nazis in Germany gave, for some Germans in Slovenia, 
not only a needed political ally that would strengthen their hand within Yugosla-
via, but was also a means of rejuvenating and reinforcing the spiritual connections 
to Germandom that were in danger of being severed by the perceived aggressive 
and oppressive Slovene-majority authorities.13 Though many German nationalists 
in Slovenia were immediately enticed by the rise to political power of the National 
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Socialists, a subset of others remained wary. After the NSDAP and its political allies 
gained a majority of seats in the 5 March 1933 Reichstag election, the Slovenia-
based German-language newspaper Deutsche Zeitung cheered the wide range of vot-
ers who had made the “German wonder” of “Adolf Hitler’s liberation movement” a 
success.14 Welcoming the “turnaround of the German people and its fate” that the 
Nazis’ political breakthrough had caused, the Deutsche Zeitung castigated critics who 
had “prophesied the deterioration” of the Nazi Party and its ability to “take power 
through legal means.” The paper declared that “Adolf Hitler has […] through legal 
means […] achieved the German revolution, the uplifting of the nation [Aufbruch 
der Nation], the Third Reich.”15 
Putting the blame on “communists” and “lackeys of Moscow” in burning the 
Reichstag, the paper rejected the notion that the Nazis had achieved their electoral 
victory through illegal or violent methods.16 The Deutsche Zeitung’s accusation of 
communist terrorism in Germany was one reason for its support of the NSDAP’s 
political victory: “The elections […] are of great significance for Europe, since it sig-
nals the liquidation of Communism.” The paper also explicitly included the German 
minority community in its celebration of the result of the 5 March election. “Not 
only the Germans in the Reich or in Austria, but rather all Germans in the world joy-
ously and, deeply moved, thank God that He has sent the German Volk, of which we 
are a part […] the right man […].”17
The Deutsche Zeitung’s crowing over the NSDAP’s electoral success was tem-
pered by its awareness that a significant portion of its readership held critical views 
of the violent tendencies of the Nazis. Stressing the legal methods by which the Nazis 
gained power was intended to reassure or placate that segment of German-speakers 
in Slovenia which was skeptical of aspects of National Socialism, while the paper’s 
clear joy about the significance of the National Socialists’ ideology for the renewal 
of the Volk shows that there was also a considerable amount of Germans in Slove-
nia who were supportive of or, indeed, fanatical in their shared beliefs with National 
Socialism. 
The paper’s strongly-worded reference to God’s involvement in the rise of 
National Socialism reflects a robust Catholicism and Christian identity among Ger-
man-speakers in Slovenia that, until then, had been largely apolitical. By linking 
Christianity with the Nazis, the Deutsche Zeitung was attempting to persuade those 
Germans who felt strongly about their religion and opposed the anti-Christian ten-
dencies of the National Socialists that the revolutionary movement was not a threat 
to their way of life.18 As well, the Deutsche Zeitung’s stringent anti-communism sug-
gested that aspects of that ideology, perhaps its atheism, was considered especially 
threatening to strongly Catholic Germans in Slovenia. Such linking together of dis-
parate aspects of National Socialism’s appeal  – its anti-communism, legal meth-
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ods, and spiritual deliverance of Adolf Hitler to power – demonstrate the ways in 
which the German minority in Slovenia was not only divided in its views of National 
Socialism, nationalism, and identity, but how deeply held for some their Catholic 
faith was.
The Deutsche Zeitung’s reporting on events in Austria as well reflects a shared 
sense of an Austrian identity among German-speakers in Slovenia that was distinct 
from that of Germans in the Reich. On the occasion of an attempted assassination of 
Austrian Chancellor Engelbert Dollfuß in October 1933, the paper expressed relief 
that “the shots were not fatal, and we are happy that they were not deadly.”19 With 
the growing strength of the Austrian National Socialist Party (Deutsche Nationalso-
zialistische Arbeiterpartei, DNSAP) creating a threat to Dollfuß’s ruling by decree 
in early 1933, the Austrian Nazis began a period of several years marked by domes-
tic terrorism, civil war, bombings, and political suppression.20 As a reflection of its 
German-speaking, Austrian-affiliated readership, the Deutsche Zeitung’s repudia-
tion of the violence carried out by National Socialists in Austria was meant to reas-
sure both devout Catholic Germans in Slovenia as well as the Yugoslav authorities 
that this type of ideological warfare would not be spilling over the border. But the 
paper’s inclusion of Slovenia’s German-speaking population in the racial Volksge-
meinschaft points as well to a large segment of the minority community that sym-
pathized, at least in some ways, with aspects of the extreme German nationalism of 
National Socialism. 
Both of the types of German identity that I have discussed so far in this paper, 
pro- and anti-National Socialism, reflect the different strands of German national-
isms that, by the mid-1930s, had begun to emerge among the German minority in 
Slovenia. German proponents of National Socialism in Slovenia who supported Hit-
ler’s takeover of power and sought Austria’s inclusion into Nazi Germany maintained 
this sentiment, but had to remain muted due to the hostile attitude of the Yugo-
slav and Slovene governments. Other German nationalists, some of whose Christian 
identity precluded them from fully embracing National Socialism, were apprehen-
sive about the Third Reich’s intentions towards Austria and Slovenia’s Catholic Ger-
man populations, though they nonetheless remained passionate about their German 
identity as an ethnic minority within a Slavic-majority country.21 
This burgeoning split in nationalisms can be seen in a Deutsche Zeitung article 
that emphasized how Hitler had succeeded, shortly after taking power, in getting 
“millions of Catholics” to “heartily support” him, including his predecessor as chan-
cellor, Franz von Papen.22 In addition, the paper relayed a speech given by von Papen 
in January of 1934 about the “Christian principles of the Third Reich.”23 Though in 
prior speeches von Papen had been critical of certain aspects of the Nazi regime, 
the Deutsche Zeitung selectively edited its reports to include only excerpts that posi-
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tively emphasized the ways in which Christianity and National Socialism were com-
patible.24 In this way, the Deutsche Zeitung tried to persuade skeptical Catholic Ger-
mans in Slovenia of the merits of National Socialism, and show that Nazi ideology 
was compatible with their religious identity.
The German newspapers’ perspectives on events in Austria demonstrated as well 
that German-speakers in Slovenia were not completely convinced about the unity of 
the German people in regards to a distinct Catholic-Austrian identity.25 Reporting 
on this “cleavage” that had arisen at a time when “history is being made for the Ger-
man Volk”, the Deutsche Zeitung expressed deep skepticism over the “tragedy” of the 
implications of the Treaty of St. Germain-en-Laye, which had stipulated that “Aus-
tria must remain independent.” The paper lamented the “one half of Austrians” who 
were “ideologically and politically [inclined] towards the Reich”, while the other half 
embraced Catholicism as a means of “[placing] itself […] away from the natural arc 
of history of each geographically-separated body of the Volk.” It added, “these two 
parts of the Austrian people are in a mighty struggle against each other.”26
A sovereign, German, and Catholic Austria split the unity of ethnic Germans 
of the former Habsburg Empire and competed with the Third Reich for their loy-
alty. “A small group of neo-Austrians on the Danube is trying to make world his-
tory,” complained the Deutsche Zeitung in June 1936. “First, six and a half million 
[ethnic Germans] were culturally and politically disenfranchised and in every way 
made defenseless. Then came the conflicts and showdowns that led to the defeat of 
Fascism [in Austria] and to a victory for the clericals.” The paper lamented that the 
“Austrian government lies in the hands of a group of people who completely pursue 
the policies of the Vatican.”27 
The Deutsche Zeitung’s derision of an independent Austria and what was becom-
ing a unique Catholic and German Austrian identity demonstrates the ideological 
cleavage that had split German-speakers’ identities between pro-Nazi nationalists 
and anti-Nazi Austro-Catholics in Slovenia after the rise of National Socialism in 
the Reich. While the first several post-war years had seen the forced exclusion of 
Austria from Germany, the Nazis’ taking of power in the Reich and explicit calls 
for Anschluss changed the dynamics of how German identity was shaped among 
the minority communities of East and Central Europe. Before the establishment of 
the Nazi state, Germans’ identities and nationalisms in Slovenia could be defined in 
terms of a shared language, culture, and history. That Hitler established racial crite-
ria in determining who was a German narrowed the spectrum for who could be a 
part of the Volk. For example: Catholic, ethnically German residents of Lower Styria 
or Carinthia who were married to Catholic, German-speaking, and ethnically Slo-
vene spouses would not be able to include their family in this new Volksgemein-
schaft. For those German-speakers in Slovenia who identified themselves as strongly 
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by their German language and culture as by their Roman Catholic religion or affili-
ation to an independent, Catholic Austria, the new German nationalism as defined 
by National Socialism was not especially appealing, and the Third Reich was not the 
welcoming homeland for European Germandom that it was touted to be. 
The Deutsche Zeitung’s attacks on the Catholic characteristics of Austria and 
German identity, as well as its lament over the “defeat of Fascism”, represent a cul-
ture war. This culture war, in contrast to the 1920s, was not occurring between Slo-
venes and Germans but between Germans themselves – between traditionalist Aus-
tro-Catholic Germans and more Reich-oriented German nationalists. At risk was 
the spiritual unity of the Volksgemeinschaft, and with it, the national renewal of the 
German people that had been ushered in by the National Socialist revolution. If Hit-
ler, as an embodiment of the living will of the entire German Volk, demanded the 
loyalty of every single German in the world, then it was intolerable for there to be a 
source of loyalty for millions of Germans other than National Socialism. One of the 
major tasks of the Deutsche Zeitung, as a de facto arm of National Socialist ideology 
outside of the Third Reich, was to convince the Germans of Slovenia who were not 
already devoted to the Nazis of the necessity of becoming so – to end any and all 
conflicts about German identity and nationalism. This ideological cleavage among 
Germans in Slovenia intensified after the Third Reich’s “seizure of power in Austria” 
was “bloodlessly completed”, in March of 1938, as described by the Slovenia-based 
German-language Mariborer Zeitung. The paper repeatedly stressed that there had 
been “nowhere in all Austria any confrontations.”28 Reporting on Austrian Chancel-
lor Kurt Schuschnigg’s farewell address before giving up power, it quoted in full his 
speech, with his accusations of the “news about Austria” being “made up” and print-
ing his final appeal: “So I depart in this hour from the Austrian Volk with a German 
word and with a heart’s desire: God protect Austria!”29 
The Mariborer Zeitung’s description of the Anschluss of Austria to Nazi Ger-
many demonstrates the continued mixed reaction among Slovenia’s German minor-
ity to National Socialism’s brand of German nationalism and identity. Calling the 
Anschluss a “seizure of power” left open to its readership the question of whether 
this was a good or bad thing; the term Machtergreifung, depending upon one’s poli-
tics, signified either the extension of the beginning of the “national revolution” that 
had begun in Germany in 1933, or a naked power grab by a violent minority with 
authoritarian aims.30 
The Mariborer Zeitung illustratively portrayed Adolf Hitler’s entrance into the 
Austrian capital as “all Vienna” on the street to “experience the historic hour of [his] 
arrival.” Calling him chancellor instead of Führer, the paper noted the “great inter-
est” and “excitement” of the people that “[grew] from hour to hour.” It described 
the Wehrmacht’s “invasion” as having been met with “indescribable jubilation” and 
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“fraternization” (Verbrüderung) from the Austrian population.31 The Mariborer Zei-
tung explained to its readers that Italy, also a majority Catholic country, had not 
“obliged itself to […] protect Austria from Germany” and that both Italy and Ger-
many had the “duty” to lead the “fight against the world-destroying Bolshevism.”32 
Describing the National Socialist takeover of Austria as widely welcomed by Aus-
trian citizens, whose “indescribable jubilation” at finally being reunited with their 
ethnic brothers was clearly evident, was an attempt by the Mariborer Zeitung to per-
suade its anti-Nazi readers that the Anschluss was not a negative event, but was, 
rather, popular, legitimate, and indeed legal.33 Excusing Italy’s non-interference 
showed these German-speaking readers that their Catholic religious identity was 
not under threat in Austria and would not be so should the Slovene lands ever join 
the Third Reich. By emphasizing the positive reception of the Wehrmacht and Adolf 
Hitler’s entrance into Vienna, the paper was thereby marginalizing anti-Nazi senti-
ment among German-speakers in Slovenia, who were supposed to see that events in 
neighboring Austria were considered by the vast majority as a good result, with no 
negative consequences. Combining the “duty” of both the Third Reich and Fascist 
Italy to “fight against world-destroying Bolshevism” shows as well that many Catho-
lic Germans in Slovenia had strong feelings opposed to communism.
But the Mariborer Zeitung refrained from wholly supporting the Anschluss, as 
can be seen in its unedited broadcasting of Schuschnigg’s proudly Austrian farewell, 
and this reticence to do so indicates that anti-Nazi sentiment in the German minor-
ity community of Slovenia remained significant. The paper’s repeated use of Reichs-
kanzler instead of Führer lent credence to the view that this was a legally permissi-
ble action and mollified skeptics of Adolf Hitler and the National Socialist move-
ment. Such nuanced reporting on these events demonstrates that, although perhaps 
not the more popular opinion, anti-Anschluss or anti-Nazi sentiment retained a con-
siderable presence among the German minority in neighboring Slovenia, many of 
whom held these opinions in large part because of their Roman Catholic faith and 
affiliated Austrian identity.
Throughout the 1930s, as Nazi Germany experienced increasing economic 
growth and foreign policy successes, many Germans in Slovenia became ever more 
supportive of the Third Reich and Hitler’s policies. For example, the Reich embassy 
in Yugoslavia reported to the Auswärtiges Amt in June of 1938 that, after the “situ-
ation of the local Germans [had…] considerably worsened”, the “achievement of 
Greater Germany” has aroused “fantastical hopes for an improvement” in local con-
ditions. The same report noted that this was true for all Germans in Yugoslavia, not 
just those in Slovenia who “honestly perceived […] the swastika […] as the first step 
to their own liberation.”34 It is clear as well that, for at least some of the more pas-
sionately nationalist Germans, professions of loyalty to Yugoslavia at this time were 
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merely window-dressing in an attempt to maintain good relations between the Third 
Reich and Yugoslavia. This was confirmed in a report by the Auswärtiges Amt from 
December of 1938 that, although noting that the “situation of the Germans in Yugo-
slavia had never been content since the establishment of the state”, it was crucial 
for the Reich’s foreign policy that the minorities maintain good relations with the 
authorities so as to ensure stability.35 
While there were clearly many German-speakers in Slovenia who strongly iden-
tified with the Nazi version of German nationalism, they were not the entirety 
among the minority community, and this nationalist identity in fact conflicted 
with other German-speakers’ Roman Catholicism and sense of connection to Aus-
tria. Yugoslav authorities, who had good reason to suspect National Socialist senti-
ment among members of the German community, were uncertain how many “real” 
Nazis in Slovenia there were, and how many were loyal citizens. Indeed, a member 
of the Yugoslav intelligence services wrote that it was “hard to tell” who was an “ex-
Untersteirer who is German” and “who is a ‘cross-breed’ and changes sides when it 
is opportune.”36 It is therefore difficult to determine exactly how many Germans in 
Slovenia were pro-Nazi nationalists and how many were anti-Nazi traditionalists. It 
is clear that a majority at least were supportive of many aspects of National Social-
ism, though just how large this majority was likely grew and decreased over time in 
response to political events and actions taken by the Third Reich.
Relations between the German minorities and the Yugoslav authorities deterio-
rated through 1940,37 as the new Serbian-nationalist military government “arrested 
the entire ethnic German leadership” of the country, who then, after being released, 
did their best to assure the new leaders of their loyalty.38 After Italy’s ill-advised deci-
sion to attack Greece in October of 1940 precipitated the Wehrmacht’s invasion of 
Yugoslavia on 6 April 1941, the country was partitioned between the different Axis 
powers: Germany completed the geographical expansion of the Greater German 
Reich by annexing39 northern Slovenia, whose “population according to Nazi ide-
ology was amenable to speedy Germanization.”40 Though some Nazi-oriented Ger-
mans in Slovenia were actively serving the Sicherheitsdienst (SD) intelligence and 
military sections from the time of the Anschluss to the 1941 invasion,41 the majority 
of ethnic Germans were kept in the dark about the Nazis’ intentions and obeyed the 
Yugoslav military’s mobilization orders after 6 April.42 
Ethnic Germans in annexed Slovenia had become, after more than two decades, 
spiritually and geographically re-united with European Germandom in the eyes of 
both, the nationalists who had been desiring such a reconnection throughout that 
time and the occupying National Socialist forces. The now-Nazified and renamed 
Marburger Zeitung43 welcomed the “inevitable” result of the Wehrmacht “liber-
ating” Slovenia’s ethnic Germans. The paper explained to its readers that a “new 
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time” had begun for the region, since the “social state in the truest meaning of the 
word” of “Adolf Hitler’s Third Reich” meant that the “Volksgemeinschaft, of which 
we had until now been separated by the unbearable Versailles system, [now] spans 
our beloved […] Styria.”44 German occupation signified the end of the “twenty-two 
years” that “the public use of our German mother tongue” had been “refused.” “Now 
the time has come where we can once more openly profess our German Volkstum,” 
proclaimed a newspaper editorial.45 Marburg/Maribor and the rest of Lower Styria 
were now free, according to the National Socialist-dominated rhetoric of the local 
German-language newspaper.46 In line with the newspaper’s sentiment, the Nazi 
leadership did indeed see the invasion and occupation of Slovenia as a liberation. 
Since the late 1930s, the Reich Foreign Ministry had viewed the Slovene govern-
ment and Slovene people’s actions against Germans as “terrorist activities.” Contrary 
to local German nationalists’ views of these actions (at least as espoused in the Ger-
man-language press) the Reich embassy reports detailed how they saw anti-German 
attitudes as permeating Slovene society, from the authorities, to the press, to the 
local civilians themselves.47
The Marburger Zeitung’s framing of the German invasion was an attempt to 
explain to the apprehensive segments of its readership why the Wehrmacht’s annex-
ation had spiritual importance for Slovenia’s minority community. The paper’s con-
fident tone laid claim to being the true opinion of Slovenia’s entire German minor-
ity in approving the Third Reich invading and occupying Yugoslavia. In interpret-
ing the Nazis’ invasion for its readership, the Marburger Zeitung thereby exposes the 
fault lines that divided German-speakers in Slovenia in their identity and national-
isms: those German nationalists who were ardent supporters of National Socialism 
and believed in their belonging to the Volksgemeinschaft could rejoice at their lib-
eration from Slavic overlords, while others, whose identities were shaped as much 
by their Christian faith and affiliation to the Austria of the Habsburgs, could have 
been torn between their desire to regain their prior privileges while living in a Ger-
man-dominated society and their distaste over being ruled by a Nazi administration.
Though fervent nationalism ran deep among many Germans in Slovenia, Cathol-
icism’s role in society was also persistent and strong, as evidenced by the Marburger 
Zeitung’s framing of contemporary events. At Easter, the paper celebrated the Chris-
tian holiday with “the sign of the victorious flags of Adolf Hitler.” The paper’s edi-
torial equated Christ’s rising from the dead with the Nazi invasion; just as Jesus 
Christ’s resurrection had brought humanity out of darkness and into a new age, so 
too did Hitler and the Wehrmacht accomplish a similar phenomenon in Yugosla-
via and Europe. Notably, the paper published a full-length photograph of the Führer 
looking nobly into the distance, in full military uniform, but without any outward 
sign of the infamous Nazi swastika.48 
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German-speakers’ Roman Catholic identity was clearly deeply-held and wide-
spread in Slovenia, as the Marburger Zeitung’s extensive efforts to relate to the Chris-
tian denomination evince. That the newspaper would show a full-length photograph 
of Adolf Hitler but decline to display the Nazi swastika suggests that a not inconsid-
erable number of those Germans who had strong anti-Nazi views were ambivalent 
at best in how they felt about the Führer. However, while some Germans in Slove-
nia felt more strongly about their Catholic identity than their German nationalism, 
this was not the case for many others. Although almost all Germans in Slovenia were 
Roman Catholic, a great many of them were supporters of National Socialism, and 
their religion did not interfere with or cause them to question their identifying with 
the radical German nationalism that the Nazis espoused. Partisan warfare in Slove-
nia and Yugoslavia was particularly brutal during the Axis occupation, and much 
has been written about the role of Slovenia’s Germans during this occupation that is 
beyond the scope of this article.49 What I have identified as the Austro-Catholic Ger-
mans in Slovenia, though a minority in the German community, were very appre-
hensive about the Nazi occupying force. This anti-Nazi sentiment was documented 
by a report written by the American embassy in March of 1942, which understood 
the arrival of National Socialism in Slovenia as a situation where “room must be 
made for a new mystic religion of blood and race as practiced by the old German 
race”, an action that would lead to the “abolition of Catholicism.”50 Such unease with 
National Socialist ideology in thought and practice explains partly why local and 
foreign National Socialist ideologues expended such effort to persuade and recruit 
those Catholic Germans in Slovenia who were hesitant to join the Nazi cause.51
For German nationalists who had cheered the rise of the Third Reich that her-
alded the revolution that was to renew the Volk, the events of April 1941 established 
the dominance of a German identity and nationalism in Slovenia that was in step 
with National Socialism. Other nationalists who had, as Roman Catholics and Aus-
trians, contested this intra-German culture war were glad to have their prior social 
status and privileges restored, but not necessarily at the expense of either the vio-
lence and atrocities that were to come, nor, indeed, of their religious identity. Despite 
the pro-Nazi stance of the Marburger Zeitung after Slovenia came under German 
occupation, not all Germans in Slovenia agreed that the National Socialist regime 
was a liberation. While the Germans of Slovenia became once more a part of the 
German Volk, the nature of this Volk was not one that all approved of. 
As the ultranationalist Nazi Party first increased and then strengthened its politi-
cal power in Germany in the late 1920s and early 1930s, the ethnic German minority 
in nearby Slovenia found itself in a divided community. On one side of this divide, 
most Germans in Slovenia embraced what they saw as a movement and interna-
tional force that could improve their position within Yugoslavia while also rejuve-
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nating and reinforcing the spiritual connections to Germandom that had been exis-
tentially threatened by the Slovene-majority’s perceived oppressive post-war mea-
sures.
While many German nationalists in Slovenia became enraptured by the rise to 
political power of the National Socialists, a significant minority composed particu-
larly of ‘Austro-Catholics’ remained decidedly apprehensive. These ethnic Germans 
in Slovenia, who made up the smaller side of the divided minority community, found 
their loyalties belonging more to a distinct type of Austro-Catholic identity that was 
a part of the German nation and culture but incompatible with the Nazis’ ideas of 
German nationalism. Intensifying these competing loyalties was the increasing per-
ception of Austria, both from within and outside the country, as a Catholic German 
bastion of anti-Nazi sentiment. Although these Germans spoke the German lan-
guage and were proud of their German cultural heritage, my analysis of the pro-Nazi 
German newspapers’ reporting on and editorializing of events show that this did not 
necessarily mean that they were politically aligned with the nationalism, ideology, 
and extremist actions of the National Socialists of the Third Reich. American and 
German diplomatic reports from the time show that outsiders perceived most of the 
Germans in Slovenia to be pro-Nazi, while the local German-language newspapers’ 
nuanced reporting on wider events evinces a strong current of an anti-Nazi, Catho-
lic, and Austrian orientation present among the minority community.
It is clear that, from the time of Hitler’s rise to power in 1933 to the German inva-
sion of Yugoslavia in 1941, there were many Germans in Slovenia who became fer-
vent supporters of the Third Reich and its ideology. Moreover, the Reich’s reach into 
German culture and society in Yugoslavia was long indeed, and should not be dis-
counted.52 But this influence was never total, and both cultural and societal anti-
Nazi bulwarks remained – the most prominent being Catholicism and a distinctive 
Austrian identity, many of whose adherents had a different idea of nationalism, a dif-
ferent idea of what it meant to be German. 
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